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Abstract - Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, and we claim the corruption is driven by imitative 
behavior for those agents facing an institutional design of corruption. So this paper analyzes an individual 
level approach and tackles the question of why people engage in corrupt exchange. We show that 
institutional design determines corruption and that there exists a threshold level in order to imitate the non-
corrupt (honest) behavior. 
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 1 Introduction
Why are some countries poor and others rich? This has been the subject of considerable interest to
social scientists for centuries. It is widely accepted that economic growth is a function of human capital,
physical capital and technology. There is a growing consensus that it is the quality of institutions that
matter in developing these essential recipes of economic growth. Good governance, an inverse function of
corruption, is the major catalyst in sprouting such institutions. So the types of institutions determine the
more pro￿table economic activities, and then they determine in some vein the individual behavior. That
is, institutions ruled out the rights and incentives of economic agents.
Institutions represent a set of rules that govern social and economic way of life for a small group of
individuals or an entire society. Preferences guide the conduct and individual behavior, which in turn deter-
mines in aggregate, these same institutions. In short, preferences and institutions are mutually determined,
and the circle can be virtuous or vicious.
The word "corruption" comes from the adjective corruptus, which in Latin means damaged, broken
or destroyed. According to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary a meaning for corruption in the social
context is bribery, and corruption is equivalent to a moral decay. Corruption is de￿ned as the behavior that
deviates from implicit or explicit behavioral norms with or without legal and ethical connotations ruled out
by institutions (see Mishra, 2006). Collier (2002), for example, de￿nes corruption as a particular type of
individual behavior even if he uses an "institutional choice approach" to explain corruption which suggests
a view of corruption as an institution (that may or may not be chosen).
Thinking about corruption as "the rules of the game" as an institution, when almost everyone is corrupt,
honesty is the deviant behavior. What needs to be explained under those circumstances is not why any one
is corrupt, what needs to be explained is how corruption became the rules of the game, and we show that it
is due to an imitative behavior given a ￿xed institutional design. Acemoglu et al. (2005) pointed out that a
primary importance for economic performance are the type of institutions in society, since they in￿ uence the
structure of economic incentives. For instance, without e¢ cient institutions on property rights, individuals
will not have the incentive to invest in physical or human capital or adopt more e¢ cient technologies.
Hence institutions are important because they help to allocate resources to their most e¢ cient uses, they
determine who gets pro￿ts, revenues and residual rights of control. But what if a corrupt behavior controls
institutions, what about the economic performance? Hence, the aim of this paper is to analyze why the
corrupt behavior and the factors that determine it.
In every country there is corruption, Mexico is certainly not the exception. The scourge of corruption
in Mexico is a nice real example of corrupt behavior driven by imitation, i.e. to be corrupt if the others are
doing it. The tenacity of corruption in Mexico has no kept politicians from promising to eradicate it, since
Mexicans correctly identify corruption either at the root of Mexico￿ s development problems or the cause of a
poverty trap through a cultural fact of doing as others do (see Wydick, 2008). Corruption occurs at all levels
of the Mexican society, for instance the legendary case of the 114-million-dollar deposited into Swiss bank
accounts by Raul Salinas, brother of the former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who shortly thereafter
￿ ed to exile in Ireland. The money was believed to have came through relationships with Mexican and
1Colombian drug cartels during his presidential time administration of the Mexican government. Another
case of corruption in Mexico was given in 2004 by Carlos Ahumada, a 40 years old millionaire, who o⁄ered
million-peso bribes to o¢ cials of Mexico￿ s left-of-center Partido de la Revoluci￿n DemocrÆtica to obtain
lucrative sewer-cleaning contracts in Mexico city.4 In any case, corruption comes at all levels in Mexico as
a kind of "cultural behavior", since the word for bribe, mordida, literally means the bite, and getting bitten
in Mexico is regrettably common. In Mexico the mordida permeates every level of society and institutions
where individuals acting because it is a norm and they just do what the others are doing (to corrupt or
not). Bribes in Mexico are common and indeed are often deemed necessary for obtaining business licenses
and other types of permits, there is a popular Mexican saying: "el que no transa no avanza, who does not
corrupt does not move on".
Of course corruption is not a norm of behavior in every country (e.g. New Zealand, Singapore or
Finland, see Transparency International on the Global Corruption Barometer, 2010)5 but we wonder what
accounts for adopting a corruptive behavior or not? We argue that the answer of this question is in￿ uenced
by individual￿ s expectations driven by imitative behavior about the choices of others around to corrupt or
not.
We present a novel model to explain why individuals imitate a corrupt behavior thinking of it as a
kind of rational behavior. Rational imitation can be explained as follows. An individual, A, can be said to
imitate the behavior of another individual, B, when observation of the behavior of B a⁄ects A in such a way
that A￿ s subsequent behavior becomes more similar to the observed behavior of B. An individual can be
said to act rationally when the individual, faced with a choice between di⁄erent courses of actions, chooses
the course which is the best with respect to her interests, her beliefs about possible action opportunities,
and the e⁄ects of these potential action opportunities (for a survey on the notion of imitation see Sanditov,
2006). Certainly, this election is in￿ uenced by the behavior and ￿llings of the society in the moment when
each individual does a choice.
In our model, imitation results in individuals performing a spectrum of tasks "as others do", that is to
be corrupt or not. We assume that occasionally each individual in a ￿nite population gets an impulse to
revise her (pure) strategy choice either corruption and non-corruption. There are three basic elements:
1. First, it is a speci￿cation of the time rate at which individuals in the population review their current
strategy choice whether they are currently corrupt individuals or not. This rate may depend on the
current performance of the agent￿ s pure strategy and of other aspects of the current population state.
2. Second, it is a speci￿cation of the choice probabilities of a reviewing individual. The probability
i-strategist will switch to some pure strategy j may depend on the current performance of these
strategies and other aspects of the current population state, that is how large is currently the share
of corrupt individuals and types of institutions in the economy.
3. The last main question is: how the ￿llings and believes of the society as a whole, act on the choice of
each individual.
4See Wydick (2008:1) from BBC News, October 20, 1998 and Wall Street Journal, June 23 of 2004, respectively each one.
5Available at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010
2If these impulses arrive according to i.i.d. Poisson processes, then the probability of simultaneous
impulses is zero, and the aggregate process is also a Poison process. Moreover, the intensity of the aggregate
process is just the sum of the intensities of the individual processes. If the population is large, then one may
approximate the aggregate process by deterministic ￿ ows given by the expected payo⁄s from corruptive
and non-corruptive behaviors. Bj￿rnerstedt and Weibull (1996) studied a number of such models, where
those individuals who revise may imitate other agents in their player-population, and show that a number of
payo⁄-positive selection dynamics, including the replicator dynamics, may be so derived. In particular, if an
individual￿ s revision rate is linearly decreasing in the expected payo⁄ to her strategy (or to the individual￿ s
latest payo⁄ realization), then the intensity of each pure strategy￿ s Poisson process will be proportional to
its population share, and the proportionality factor will be linearly decreasing in its expected payo⁄. If
every revising agent selects her future strategy by imitating a randomly drawn agent in their own player
population, then the resulting ￿ ow approximation is the replicator dynamics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the baseline model and individ-
uals￿payo⁄s of corruption or not. Section 3 starts the dynamics and subsection 3.1 o⁄ers the main result
of the paper regarding the evolution of corrupt behavior. Section 4 studies a case when imitation is due to
dissatisfaction and individuals do not have a complete knowledge on the true value of the expected payo⁄s.
Section 5 sets out some intuitive public policy recommendations. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude.
2 The baseline model
Institutions, according to North (1990), are the rules of the game that comprise formal laws, informal
constraints, shared norms, beliefs and self-imposed limits on behavior and their enforcement characteristics;
i.e., courts, police, judgemental aunts, etc. This broad de￿nition bundles norms together with institutions
and is also favored by Greif (2006): "An institution is a system of rules, beliefs, norms and organizations
that together generate a regularity of social behavior."
We reamrk that in this paper we do not consider "institution formation", but we take as given the
institutional design from some external (to the individual) form which include the whole structure of rules,
means of detecting violation and adjudicating punishments. In order to develop the sequel model, let us
state the next de￿nitions:
De￿nition 1 We say that "an individual imitates rationally" when faced with a choice between di⁄erent
types of possible future behaviors to adopt it, chooses that type of behavior followed by people, who according
to their current beliefs, is representing the higher expected pro￿t.
Of course this individual choice is in￿ uenced by the social perception of these behaviors, when making
a decision (see Sanditov, 2006).
Let us consider that there are two types of institutions: the corrupt and non corrupt. A distribution or
pro￿les in these subgroups represented by I = fIc;Incg. Two types of individuals act in such an economy.
The type will be represented by an index i 2 fc;ncg.
3De￿nition 2 We understand as "corrupt institutions" those institutions being caused to regulate individual
behavior in terms of social interest by law, deviate from that goal to pursue and they are not punishing but
so promoting any individual behavior which is contrary to the goal that gave them birth.
The e¢ ciency of an institution is de￿ned by its ability to foster growth and economic and social welfare,
and to prevent individual behavior contrary to the laws governing coexistence.
Individuals have already formed preferences on social welfare and their own. Based on these preferences
will be willing or not, to follow a corrupt conduct. They are grouped by type, into two distinct subpopula-
tions, of those who follow the corrupt behavior and those who do not accept this type of behavior (honest
or non-corrupt).
De￿nition 3 We say that "an individual is corrupt" or follow a corrupt behavior, when guided by self-
interest, she is acting aside from the laws that govern the society in which is embedded.
Then, institutional quality will refer to the extent to which such external elements are e⁄ective in de-
tecting and punishing corrupt activities. Corrupt institutions of course consist of people performing corrupt
acts. Consider an economy populated by types of institutions, g, from individuals, i, where individuals
must behave as a corrupt or not, i.e. individuals￿decision type i 2 fc;ncg is corrupt c or not nc.6 Let the
share of institutional design type be denoted by the vector g = (gc; gnc) normalized to one, gc + gnc = 1.
E¢ cient or good institutions use mechanisms to punish the corrupt individual behavior, or non-legal ac-
tivities of its employees, while these mechanisms do not exist in corrupt institutions. Corrupt individuals
may obtain an extra-income from non-legal activities.
Assume that the social welfare is measured by a common good and all individuals in the society has
the opportunity to use it in an equalitarian form this good. So if the total welfare in the society is de￿ned
by a real positive number, S 2 R+, each individual receive the same quantity of welfare from the society
s = S=N where N is the ￿nite size of the population. However not all individual has the same taste for
this good.
Suppose also that all individual in the society is engaged in an institution, and assume in addition that
all individual receive the same salary given by m: The pair (s;m) de￿nes a social state. Hence individuals￿
utility is de￿ned by the function Ui : R ￿ R ! R, i 2 fc;ncg, i.e.
Ui (s; m) = s￿i ￿ m￿i (1)
where ￿i > 0 measures the marginal impact of welfare distribution and ￿i > 0 measures the marginal
utility from monetary payo⁄s for all behavior i 2 fc;ncg.
However, the individual utility is a⁄ected either by matching with a good institution or a bad one.
Hence when a corrupt individual matches a bad institution gc, then:
Ucgc (s; m) = s￿c(m + bc)￿c, (2)
6It is assumed here that individuals who would actively bene￿t from the continued functionality ￿ good or bad￿ of
institutions have no capacity to in￿uence the institution designer type.
4where bc > 0 is earning of corruption activities. While matching a good institution gnc, then:
Ucgnc (s; m) = s￿c(m + bc)￿c ￿ MPnc (e); (3)
where M > 0 is the cost or punishment for the corrupt behavior and Pnc (e) 2 (0;1) measures a probability
of monitoring corrupt activities or institutional e⁄ectiveness on eliminating corruption.
On the other side, the individual utility of non-corrupt behavior is:
Uncgnc (s; m) = s￿nc ￿ m￿nc (4)
with ￿nc > ￿c meaning that non-corrupt individuals enjoy more the social state because such an individual
matches a good gnc institutional type.
Moreover, let us continue considering that if a non-corrupt individual is matched with a bad institution,
then her utility function linearly decreases by facing such an institution gc, i.e.:
Uncgc (s; m) = s￿nc ￿ m￿nc ￿ Anc (5)
where Anc > 0 measured a disagreement for facing a bad institution. As we see, this parameter indirectly
measured the degree of social disapproval towards a corrupt behavior.
Then the expected payo⁄ of a corrupt individual is given by:
E(c=g) = [s￿c(m + bc)￿c]gc + [s￿c(m + bc)￿c ￿ MPnc (e)]gnc: (6)
And the expected payo⁄ of a non-corrupt individual is:
E(nc=g) = [s￿ncm￿nc ￿ Anc]gc + [s￿ncm￿nc]gnc: (7)
So rational individuals prefer to be non-corrupt when E(c=g) < E(nc=g), and this inequality follows if:
gc <





Uncgnc (s; m) ￿ Ucgc (s; m) + MPnc
Anc + MPnc(e)
= gh: (9)
Hence individuals prefer to be non-corrupt if the share of bad institutions is lower than this threshold
value, gc < gh.
Note that [￿nc + MPnc(e)] > [Uncgnc (s; m) ￿ Ucgnc (s; m)] indicates that as far as the punishment
cost for corruption, MPnc(e) plus the disagreement of facing a bad institution, Anc is large enough, then
individuals prefer to behave honestly and do not to inquire in corrupt activities. So here we have an incentive
for bad individuals to turn over non-corrupt activities when the number of bad institutions declines and
they will be better under better institutions. Note also, that the intensity of the displeasure that the
5corrupt behavior creates in an honest worker, (measured here by Anc) plays a positive social role in the
imitation game, doing that the threshold value, from that the honest behavior has an higher expected value,
decreases. It is natural to think that in a society where the imitative behavior plays a central role, the
degree of social disapproval toward a behavior in￿ uence the choice of individual behavior. The intensity
with which society disapproves of social behavior is partially represented in our model by Anc.
It can be shown that when the distaste for corrupt behavior, as measured by Anc is high, then more
e¢ cient is the punishment for corrupt behavior. It is natural to think that in a society where imitation
plays a central role, the degree of social rejection toward a behavior can in￿ uence the behavior of individual
choice. The above can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The following statements are veri￿ed:
1. If Anc > [Uncgnc (s; m) ￿ Ucgc (s; m)] then the threshold value gh increases with the expected payo⁄
of punishment for corrupt behavior.
2. If Anc < [Uncgnc (s; m) ￿ Ucgc (s; m)] then the threshold value gh > 1 such that E(nc=g) > E(c=g);8 g.
Proof. Let gh : fR ￿ Ancg ! R be de￿ned by:
gh(MPnc) =
Uncgnc (s; m) ￿ Ucgc (s; m) + MPnc
Anc + MPnc(e)
; (10)
see (9). It follows that:
dgh(MPnc)
dMPnc
> 0 , Anc > [Uncgnc (s; m) ￿ Ucgc (s; m)].
Therefore, we state the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If
[Ucgc (s; m) ￿ Uncgnc (s; m)] < 0;
to get an e¢ cient punishment of the corrupt individual, will be ensured that:
MPnc > ￿[Ucgc (s; m) ￿ Uncgnc (s; m)]
Proof. Note that the function gh(MPnc) (equation (10)) is increasing 8 MPnc > 0, but positive if
and only if MPnc > ￿[Ucgc (s; m) ￿ Uncgnc (s; m)]. Otherwise the threshold value is zero or negative and
veri￿ed for any distribution gc > gh.
Under the conditions of Proposition1 and Corollary 1: As the threshold increases, measures of pun-
ishment for corrupt behavior are more e¢ cient. Ful￿lling the conditions of the corollary that only high
punishment will have social impact. However if the probability of facing a corrupt institution is greater
than this threshold, either because the penalties are low and large the number of ine¢ cient institutions or
6because society does not have a strong rejection towards corrupt institutions, then corrupt behavior tends
to become a model worthy of imitation. Under this situation we can state the following remark:
Remark 1 If corruption is high, then it is contagious and does not respect borders sector. Corruption
reduces levels of morality and trust behavior. Once it takes root, it tempts others and reduces the incentive
to attack it. When levels of Anc diminish, it becomes harder to resist corrupt practices.
In short, as bad institutions become less, and as individuals have an increased odds for using or dealing
with such institutions (measured by Anc), then imitation will be to conduct legal and non-corrupt activities.
3 On the dynamics of corrupt behavior
Consider that individuals￿population i 2 fc;ncg compromises a pro￿le distribution x = (xc;xnc) normalized
to one, xc + xnc = 1. Individuals are absolutely rational, so they change their behavior according to the
expected payo⁄s associated with such an adopted behavior i. Assume that in time t = t0 the pro￿le
distribution is x(t0) = (xc(t0);xnc(t0)), and the pro￿le distribution of institutions is ￿xed at q = (gc;gnc).
So the evolution of individuals￿type i 2 fc;ncg depends on di⁄erences in expected payo⁄s and the
dynamic ￿ ow of individuals must follow the next evolution:
_ xnc = [E(nc=g) ￿ E(c=g)] _ xc
_ xnc = ￿_ xc
(11)
Hence the share of non-corrupt individuals may increase, decreases or is stationary and this is according
to the sign of E(nc=g) ￿ E(c=g). In fact the share of the most successful behavior may increase.
Proposition 2 In a given period of time t = t0 is veri￿ed x(t0) = (xnc(t0), xc(t0)), hence:
1. If gc(t) < gh 8 t > t0 implies that (xnc;xc) ! (1;0) with t ! 1; 8 (xnc(t0);xc(t0)) 6= (1;0).
2. If Uncgnc ￿ Ucgc > Anc implies that (xnc(t);xc(t)) ! (1;0) with t ! 1;8(xnc(t0);xc(t0)) 6= (1;0)
regardless of the distribution g.
3. If [Ucgc (s; m) ￿ Uncgnc (s; m)] < 0 then for values MPcn > ￿[Uncgnc (s; m) ￿ Ucgc (s; m)] takes
place at time t, an increase in the percentage of corrupt individuals if and only if gc(t) < gh(MPnc).
Proof. If gc(t) < gh 8 t > t0, then [E(nc=g) ￿ E(c=g)] < 0 and it follows the ￿rst statement of the
theorem. From point (2) of theorem (1) it follows that gh > 1 then the percentage of bad or corrupt
institutions never exceeds the threshold value. Note that in this case for all values of gc is veri￿ed that
gc > gh so that the evolution of the system goes to ((xnc;xc) = (0;1). In this case, only from an expected
value of punishment for corrupt behavior more than ￿[Uncgnc (s; m) ￿ Ucgc (s; m)] will gh(MPnc) > 0
when gc(t) < gh, then in such a time t the percentage of corrupt individuals decreases.
7To simplify the future analysis of this evolution, and to obtain some conclusion, let assume that:
￿c = ￿nc = ￿c = ￿nc = 1:
In this case it follows that E(nc=g)￿E (c=g) = MPnc(e)￿gc(1+MPnc(e))￿bcs, and the threshold value





Then, the share of the non-corrupt individuals increases as far as the share of bad institutions is lower and
veri￿es the inequality gc < ^ gh. To get an economy of non-corrupt individuals the share of good institutions
should be large enough and this happen as large is the welfare distribution s and earning of corruption
activities decreases, bc.
3.1 Corrupt behavior by imitation
Assume that individuals do not have complete information for the exact values of E(c=g), E(nc=g) and g.
Our exercise of imitative behavior works out in the following way (see Accinelli et al 2010). A reviewer
individual i under the probability ri(x) 2 [0;1] raises the question about if she must or not change her
current type i 2 fc;ncg. So ri (x) is the time rate at which at which individuals review their strategy choice.
This probability depends on the actual distribution of the population x and in the bene￿ts associated with
her current behavior.7 It is natural to assume that the likelihood that an individual make to herself this
question, depends inversely with the performance of her current behavior.
Having opted for a change, the individual will adopt a strategy followed by the ￿rst person from the
population to be encountered (her neighbor), i.e. there is a probability pi=j(x) 2 [0;1], that a reviewing
i￿strategist really switch to some pure strategy j 2 fc;ncg. In a ￿nite population one may imagine
that review times of an agent are the arrival time of a Poisson process with arrival time ri(x), and that
at each time the agents selects a pure strategy according to the probability distribution pi=j(x). Consider
independence of switches across agents, and the process of switches from strategy i to strategy j as a Poisson
Process with arrival rate xiripi=j. Assuming a continuum of agents and by the law of large numbers, we
model these aggregate stochastic process as a deterministic ￿ ow. So the evolution of the population will
be given by the following dynamic system:
_ xnc = rc(x)pc=ncxc ￿ rnc(x)pnc=cxnc
_ xc = ￿_ xnc
x(t0) = (xc(t0);xnc(t0));
(12)
System (12) represents the interaction between two groups (corruptive and not) of individuals that
7This is the ￿behavioural rule with inertia￿ (see Bjornerstedt and Weibull, 1996; Weibull, 1995 and Schlag, 1998; 1999)
that allows an agent to reconsider her action with probability r 2 (0;1) each round.
8imitate their neighbors. The RHS of _ xnc is an in￿ ow-out￿ ow model: all those corrupt strategists becoming
non-corruptive minus all those non-corrupt becoming corrupt agents. The di⁄erential equation (12) can be
written as:





let us label A = rcpc=nc + rncpnc=c and B = rcpc=nc. Hence the next proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 3 If we assume an imitative behavior as the basis for the choice of individual behavior, the dis-





A) >> 0. There is only one situation in which corrupt behavior disappears in the long term, i.e.
in which equilibrium is reached at (xc;xnc) = (0;1), and this is when no agent honest (or non-corrupt) is
revising rnc = 0, and all corrupt is revising, rc = 1.
Proof. The solution of (13) is











Note that xnc(t) ! 1 when rncpc=nc = 0 happens when all the non-corrupt individuals remain with their
current behavior.
Corollary 2 The share of non-corrupt individuals, in the long term, increases with the likelihood that
corrupt individuals are reviewers, while decreasing with the likelihood that non-corrupt individuals are doing
the revision.
Proof. Just consider the quotient B=A as a function of rc and rnc, it will then:
@B=A
@drc > 0 while
@B=A
@drnc < 0.
As in the case of imitation by dissatisfaction these probabilities or frequencies depend on the results
obtained by the behavior followed by individuals of either type. The frequency will be higher in corrupt
than in non-corrupt whenever E(nc=g) > E(c=g) so gc < gh. This is summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 3 An increase in the threshold value gh brings an increase, in the long term, of the share of
individuals who follow an honest behavior.
The proposition 3 and its two corollaries (2 and 3) state that almost all possible evolutionary trajectories
for the population distribution, in the long term, lead to a mixed state in which coexist the two types
of behavior. But institutional e¢ ciency should determine the predominance of one or another type of
behavior. The e¢ ciency of existing institutions in a society can be measured by the likelihood that an
individual reviewer is corrupt. The more e¢ cient, or lower the number of corrupt institutions, the greater




P(c!nc)+P(nc!c) representing relative weight of likelihood for an individual corrupt
changing type regarding probability of reviewing type.
4 Imitation by dissatisfaction
Because dissatisfaction on current behavior an individual reviewer must copy the behavior of the ￿rst person
she meets on the street, so pi=j = xj, 8i 6= j 2 fc;ncg. Then, by rearranging terms the dynamic system
(12) takes the form:
_ xnc = (rnc ￿ rc)x2
nc + (rc ￿ rnc)xnc
_ xc = ￿_ xnc
(14)
and after some little of algebra, we get the following chain of equalities:
_ xnc = (rnc ￿ rc)x2
nc + (￿rnc + rc)xnc = (rnc ￿ rc)xnc(xnc ￿ 1)
Note that _ xn ￿ 0 if and only if (rnc(x) ￿ rc(x)) ￿ 0 and xc(t0) > 0, which means that the share of non-
corrupt individuals increases when, rc > rnc, more corrupt individuals review their behavior considering a
change on it.
Thinking that as far as the payo⁄ level of the i￿strategist, Ei(￿), increases her average reviewing rate,
ri(x), will decrease. So assume ri is linear in payo⁄ levels, thus the propensity to switch behavior is
decreasing in the level of the expected payo⁄, that is:
ri (x) = ￿i ￿ ￿iE (i=g) 8i 2 fc;ncg; (15)
where ￿i; ￿i ￿ 0 and ￿i
￿i ￿ E (i=g) assures that ri 2 [0;1]. We interpreted ￿i as a marginal degree of
dissatisfaction and ￿i as the marginal performance of the own expected payo⁄ when reviewing the current
strategy i. Then the corrupt individual makes to herself this reviewing rate more often than a non-corrupt
individual if an only if E(nc=g) > E(c=g).
We may assume that individuals do not know the exact value for the expected payo⁄s, however they
are able to take an approximation of such true values in order to estimate it. Let us denote by ￿ E(i=g)
the estimators of the true values E (i=g). The process of imitating successful behaviors exhibits payo⁄
monotonic updating, since each i￿strategist changes her strategy if and only if ￿ E(i=g) < ￿ E(j=g), 8 i 6= j 2
fc;ncg.
10To simplify consider the case of: ￿c = ￿nc = ￿ and ￿c = ￿nc = ￿. Then equation (14) becomes:
_ xnc = ￿￿
￿ ￿ E(nc=g) ￿ ￿ E(c=g)
￿
x2
nc + ￿( ￿ E(nc=g) ￿ ￿ E(c=g))xnc
_ xc = ￿_ xnc
x(t0) = (xc(t0);xnc(t0));
(16)
So the share of non-corrupt individuals increases if ￿ E(nc=g)￿ ￿ E(c=g) > 0, and this happen with a positive
probability, namely P
￿ ￿ E(nc=g) ￿ ￿ E(c=g) > 0
￿
> 0, i.e. if the event ￿ E(nc=g) ￿ ￿ E(c=g) > 0 has a positive
measure. Makes sense to assume that the probability P( ￿ E(c=g)￿ ￿ E(nc=g)) > 0) increases with the di⁄erence
between the true expected payo⁄s E(nc=g)￿E(c=g), i.e. individuals prefer to behave as non-corrupt when
E(c=g) < E(nc=g) and this inequality follows if the share of bad institutions is lower than the threshold
value, gc < gh, given by equation (8).
Theorem 1 The level xc prevailing in society depends on the institutional design g = (gc, gnc).
Proof. The ￿rst equation of system (16) can be written as:
_ xnc = ￿
￿ ￿ E(nc=g) ￿ ￿ E(c=g)
￿
xnc(1 ￿ xnc);
then _ xnc > 0 if and only if 0 < xnc < 1 (which implies that the likelihood of corrupt and non-corrupt
individuals is zero) and ￿ E(nc=g) ￿ ￿ E(c=g) > 0 which in turn increased likelihood is veri￿ed if and only if
the di⁄erence between the true expected values E(nc=g)￿E(c=g) increases. Such di⁄erence is positive and
increasing with gnc > 1￿gh; hence P( ￿ E(nc=g)￿ ￿ E(c=g) > 0) grows with the institutional type gnc > 1￿gh.
We know that people prefer to behave as a non-corrupt when E(c=g) < E(nc=g) and this inequality holds
if the percentage of corrupt institutions is lower than the threshold value, gc < gh, given by equation (8).
Established social rules have a normative character. By de￿nition, corruption means the breakdown
and moral violation of such rules. As good institutions ensure discourage corrupt behavior, such as trying
to increase the degree of social disutility, Anc. Such institutions, g = (gc, gnc), are a key to attacking
corruption.
5 Anti-corruption policy
This section will discuss brie￿ y some elements of anti-corruption policies. These are primarily public policy.
As such, they are evaluative and prescriptive guidelines of behavior in a social context, and aimed to clarify
and de￿ne solutions to public problems as in the case at hand: corruption.
We understand the evolution of corrupt behavior as the result of a rational process of imitation, it is
11possible to consider the threshold introduced in (9)
Uncgnc (s; m) ￿ Ucgc (s; m) + MPnc
Anc + MPnc(e)
= gh;
as a starting point for this discussion.
A high threshold value gh ensures that, even in the presence of a relatively high number of corrupt
institutions, as punishment for corrupt behavior or the probability of detecting it increases, the evolution
process of corruption can be a⁄ected by a negative sign making the decline over time on the proportion of
corrupt agents, and that non-corrupt increases according to the solution of the dynamic system (13).
Assuming that individual preferences are given and that in the short term they are not in￿ uenced the
institutions that govern it, the discussion of public policy measures aimed at avoiding or increasing the
positive evolution of corrupt behavior in the short term should focus on considering the denominator of
the fraction that determines the threshold above. This leads us to consider as fundamental elements the
value of the ￿nes and the likelihood of punishment for corrupt behavior, which to be e⁄ective, it must be
accompanied by a high degree of disutility in the honest created by corrupt behavior. The public policies
should be aimed at:
￿ Generate a new social culture to combat corruption. We have shown that corruption is driven by
imitation, and developing a cultural change to mimic the good citizenship can succeed in combating
corruption.
￿ Raising the level of disutility caused by corrupt behavior.
￿ Doing research and integrate basic information on the activities of the institutions to support their
actions for improving their performance.
￿ The value Anc represents the social disgust towards corruption, and it may be increased. For example:
￿Provide quality and transparency of governance.
￿Provide agreements involving the society.
Moreover it is also true that the preferences are formed in childhood, so the new members of the
institutions may di⁄er with time of their predecessors, to be in￿ uenced by their environment.
Finally, Theorem 1 points out the importance of institutions. An economy with an e¢ cient institutional
design will have low levels of corruption. Remember as Douglass North (from the new institutional eco-
nomics) tells how Justice, culture and politics disrupt the economy. For example, if it is too expensive to
make a personal or collective contract to develop an economic activity, how expensive is because institutions
do not function well. If the law allows us to ful￿ll contracts or anyone with money can go outside without
protection by law, then the transaction costs are very expensive in any country. In this line of thought, we
can conclude that when institutions are ine¢ cient and generate high transaction costs in the most e¢ cient
way to trade is through corruption or fraud. This is because corruption is often more e¢ cient than the
12established institutional rules, because they get to avoid a system of ine¢ cient institutions. Not always,
but often the corruption lowers the transaction cost. So if you want to eliminate corruption, you have
to do an improvement of the system of rules and institutions (for example, to ￿nd ways to legally lower
transaction costs).
6 Concluding remarks
We have considered throughout this work the involvement of individuals in corrupt activities responding to
an imitation process, regulated by a society in which the percentage of corrupt (or bad) institutions exceeds
a certain threshold value. However, corruption is ultimately the direct result of the decisions and behavior
of individuals determined by their preferences and realized in a society, which in￿ uences the formation of
such preferences and therefore the further decisions.
Society in￿ uences the evolution of individual behavior through institutions that establish rules of be-
havior. It is particularly important to de￿ne the future evolution of individuals behavior considering the
percentage of corrupt and non-corrupt institutions in the society. The non-corrupt behavior punished
honest deviation, while the corrupt encourage corrupt behavior facing an institutional design.
The above model is novel in the literature, indicating that corruption evolves from a process of imitation
followed by rational agents with incomplete information on the expected value of their strategic decisions.
Based on these considerations we construct a dynamic system that represents the evolution of corruption
from an initial distribution of types (good and bad) of institutions.
More generally, we have illustrated the importance of thinking about corruption based on "the rules of
the game", i.e. from institutions. When almost everyone is corrupt, honesty is a deviant behavior, and
corruption is imitated. We conclude that institutional design matters to avoid corrupt behavior, when
the number of bad institutions is lower that a certain threshold thew the economy evolves to non-corrupt
behavior. But what about the quality of institutions. Future research should go on the direction about
how can we measure the quality of institutions? That is a di¢ cult problem for future work. It is very
di¢ cult to measure and why it is so complicated theorizing about institutions compared with other ￿elds
of economy, because theory is something not seen or felt or heard.
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